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Simone de Beauvoir systematically undervalues what she calls "immanence," which consists of the physical, the habitual, the repetitious. Not only does 
she believe that women have been relegated to the realm of immanence, she believes that immanence itself has little if any value. She sees what she called 
"transcendence" as having great value and, indeed, what makes a human life different and belter from any other sort of life. I argue that her view, while 
embodying a tendency present throughout the tradition in which she works, severely distorts what is desirable for a human life and fails to properly 
value immanence. 
In The Second Sex, S imone de Beauvoir offers us a 
detailed analysis of the pos i t ion of women as she saw it. 
M a n y aspects of this analysis are st i l l meaningful in our 
contemporary context, many have been superseded by 
contemporary feminist scholarship. M y focus i n this 
paper w i l l be the examinat ion of a fundamental p h i l o -
sophical issue raised i n both The Second Sex and The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, her book o n moral phi losophy—the 
difference between, difference i n the roles of, and relative 
value of immanence and transcendence. T h e dist inction 
between these categories is not u n i q u e to de Beauvoir. She 
fol lows Heidegger and Sartre and, perhaps, i n some form 
a l l the phi losophers in the tradit ion i n w h i c h she works. I 
have chosen de Beauvoir's work because her particular 
ways of m a k i n g , expl ica t ing and v a l u i n g this dist inct ion 
enable us to see important impl ica t ions of this way of 
v iewing the wor ld . 
Before offering two important examples of her ways of 
v a l u i n g immanence and transcendence, I want to offer 
first a brief out l ine of her theory of freedom, as expressed 
i n The Ethics of Ambiguity, w h i c h is the key to the relative 
value of immanence and transcendence. Second, I want to 
offer a necessarily brief characterization of the categories of 
immanence and transcendence themselves. 
In The Ethics of Ambiguity, freedom in the sense of 
choosing freely and responsibly a m o n g our possibilities is 
a capacity and desire that h u m a n beings both have and 
ought to value. O u r freedom is grounded i n our con-
sciousness, i n particular our abi l i ty to imagine things as 
being other than they are. However, u n l i k e Sartre, w i t h 
whose views hers are understandably often conflated, de 
Beauvoir is not completely a voluntarist , but a naturalist/ 
voluntarist. For her, the desire for freedom is natural and 
our choice of it as a value is both moral ly obligatory and 
psychological ly necessary i n that we do not feel we have 
done justice to our human nature unless we exercise it. For 
de Beauvoir, happiness, or at least the right k i n d of h a p p i -
ness, can only result from the recognition of an expression 
of our freedom and is a test for the absence of bad faith. If 
we attempt to avoid freedom and f ind ourselves i n bad 
faith, we are miserable. If we embrace our freedom, if we 
choose our projects wi th an eye to creating situations for 
ourselves from w h i c h more possibilities w i l l unfo ld rather 
than s imply choosing options that result i n dead ends, we 
w i l l be happy. W h i l e she, l ike both Sartre and Heidegger, 
believes that we are always tempted to bad faith and the 
rejection of freedom, her not ion of bad faith is more exclu-
sively tied to the avoidance of freedom than either H e i -
degger's or Sartre's. For Heidegger and Sartre, the avoi-
dance of any aspect of our being can result in inauthenticity 
or bad faith. In de Beauvoir's case, it is our seeing ourselves 
as free and responsible that is absolutely fundamental. She 
does not believe there are any desires that have the same 
status as the desire for freedom, especially desires con-
nected w i t h the bodily, stability, preservation of the past, 
or emotional entanglements. She does not see h u m a n 
beings as hav ing deep, legitimate, non-negotiable needs 
for a stable environment, the love and support of others or 
a sense of continuity. T h u s , if I should say that I want to 
marry because of my passionate love for and desire for a 
life of emotional security w i t h my future partner, and go 
on to say that it is very important to me to live from the 
heart, to make decisions according to my deepest emo-
t ional intui t ions as wel l as m a k i n g decisions on the basis 
of the enhancement of freedom, de Beauvoir w o u l d be, as 
least, suspicious. She w o u l d point out that there are many 
opportunities for bad faith here, and urge me to ask myself 
whether a l l of these desires i n some way embody a desire 
for freedom and, if not, whether they do not embody a way 
of avo id ing freedom. In short, one is seen to be either 
enhancing and/or acting on freedom or denying it. 
T h o u g h immanence and transcendence are not pre-
cisely defined i n either The Ethics of Ambiguity or The 
Second Sex, we can characterize the difference between 
them in some general ways. We can see immanence as the 
bodily/physical and the involuntary, and transcendence 
as consciousness and the voluntary. We can see imman-
ence as material existence i n general, its perpetuation, and 
the maintenance of the status quo, and transcendence as 
creativity, linear goal -pursuing change as opposed to cy-
cl ical , repetitious change, and achievement. In de Beau-
voir's view, women have become symbols of immanence. 
They are seen by both men and themselves as biological 
beings, caretakers of biological being, sexual objects, 
guardians of the status q u o w h o have no capacity for the 
achievement of goals, especially creative goals, whereas 
men see themselves and women also see them as symbols 
of transcendence. T h o u g h , of course, everyone is both 
immanence and transcendence, we are a l l made anxious 
by our ambigui ty and w i s h to escape it by fleeing into one 
of its elements. M e n see themselves as transcendence whi le 
projecting their immanence onto women; women see 
themselves as immanence whi le projecting their trans-
cendence onto men. So far, this seems relatively straight-
forward. It becomes less so when we consider that, whi le 
women are nearly always i n bad faith because they neglect 
their transcendence, men do not seem to be so clearly i n 
bad faith for neglecting their immanence. Further, as one 
considers what she has to say about immanence and 
transcendence—in both The Ethics of Ambiguity and i n 
The Second Sex transcendence involves the exercise of 
freedom, and freedom is the only intr insic value—we can 
see that, for de Beauvoir, transcendence is inf initely more 
important than immanence. T w o examples help show 
how this is so: her picture of the happy life of what she 
calls "the modern married m a n " , and her analysis of 
chi ldbearing and childrearing as activities. 
De Beauvoir seems to believe that men can avoid bad 
faith even though their relationship w i t h their o w n 
immanence is, i n her analysis, extremely unclear. N o t 
only do men get far more out of the traditional arrange-
ment than do women, but they are also able to avoid bad 
faith and embrace both their immanence and transcend-
ence even though the situation i n w h i c h they do this 
involves little actual contact wi th the immanent aspects of 
life and depends u p o n robbing someone else of her free-
d o m . 1 Let us examine this situation further. 
In the case of the modern married man, there seems to be 
a basic asymmetry i n the positions of men and women. It 
is possible for a m a n a n d a w o m a n , w h o are married and 
part ic ipat ing i n the same relationship, not to be both i n 
bad faith. T h e w o m a n is inevitably i n bad faith, since she 
is denying her transcendence, but the man can avoid it. 
These two elements—maintenance and progres-
sion—are i m p l i e d i n any l i v i n g activity, and for 
man marriage permits precisely a happy synthesis of 
the two. In his occupat ion and his pol i t ica l life, he 
encounters change and progress, he senses his exten-
sion through time and the universe; and when he is 
tired of such roaming, he gets himself a home, a 
fixed location, and an anchorage i n the w o r l d . 2 
M a n marries today to obtain an anchorage i n 
immanence, but not to be himself confined therein; 
he wants to have hearth and home w h i l e being free 
to escape therefrom; he settles d o w n but often 
remains a vagabond at heart; he is not contemptu-
ous of domestic felicity, but he does not make of it an 
end i n itself; repetition bores h i m ; he seeks after 
novelty, risk, oppos i t ion to overcome, companions 
and friends w h o take h i m away from solitude a 
deux. 3 
T h e i m p l i c a t i o n of these passages is clear. M e n have 
their immanence just by part ic ipat ing i n home life to the 
extent of l i v i n g there. They need not do anything, though, 
of course, i n a tradit ional relat ionship they pay for every-
thing. They need do no work on the environment—they 
need not cook nor hang curtains in order to count as 
having taken care of their relationship to immanence. 
A d m i t t i n g one's immanence seems here to involve only 
taking one's physical needs seriously and arranging that 
they be satisfied i n a regular and pleasant way. 
T h e second example indicates her distaste for i m m a n -
ence as wel l as her seeing it as, i n some sense, a second-rate 
concern. It is this sort of discussion of immanence that 
anyone w h o is concerned w i t h both the oppression of 
women and the undervaluing of areas w h i c h have been 
traditionally considered to be women's work w i l l f ind 
disturbing. 
De Beauvoir argues that chi ldbearing and chi ldrearing 
cannot count as a legitimate project, an exercise of both 
transcendence and immanence, since transcendence is not 
exercised i n any way. She begins by c i t ing the involuntar-
iness of pregnancy. 
[S]he does not really make the baby, it makes itself 
w i t h i n her; her flesh engenders flesh only, and she is 
quite incapable of establishing an existence that w i l l 
have to establish itself. Creative acts or ig ina t ing i n 
liberty establish the object as value and give it the 
qual i ty of the essential; whereas the c h i l d i n the 
maternal body is not thus justif ied. . . . A mother can 
have her reasons for w a n t i n g a c h i l d , but she cannot 
give to this independent person, w h o is to exist 
tomorrow, his o w n reasons, his justif ication for 
existence; she engenders h i m as a product of her 
generalized body, not of her i n d i v i d u a l existence. 4 
T h u s , this part icular c h i l d is not the mother's project 
because she cannot (either f rom the standpoint of what is 
possible o r what is desirable) choose the chi ld 's values for 
her/him, and the purely physiological development of the 
c h i l d is involuntary. 
O n e may consider this pos i t ion s imply an inadequate 
assessment of the many choices a n d projects involved i n 
b r i n g i n g to term a healthy baby u n t i l one takes into 
account her apparent distaste for both the feminine physi-
cal and for the k i n d of w o r k w o m e n have tradit ionally 
done i n connect ion w i t h p r o d u c i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g 
aspects of the physical wor ld . 
Ensnared by nature, the pregnant w o m a n is plant 
a n d a n i m a l , a stock-pile of colloids, an incubator, 
a n egg; she scares ch i ldren p r o u d of their straight, 
y o u n g bodies and makes y o u n g people titter con-
temptuously because she is a h u m a n being, a con-
scious a n d free i n d i v i d u a l , w h o has become life's 
passive instrument. 5 
Few tasks are more l ike the torture of Sisyphus than 
housework, w i t h its endless repetition: the clean 
becomes soiled, the soiled is made clean, over and 
over, day after day. T h e housewife wears herself out 
m a r k i n g time: she makes noth ing , s imply perpetu-
ates the present. She never senses conquest of a posi-
tive G o o d , but rather indefinite struggle against 
negative E v i l . A y o u n g p u p i l writes i n her essay: " I 
shal l never have house-cleaning day" ; she thinks of 
the future as constant progress toward some un-
k n o w n summit ; but one day, as her mother washes 
the dishes, it comes over her that both of them w i l l be 
b o u n d to such rites u n t i l death. Eat ing, sleeping, 
cleaning—the years no longer rise u p toward heaven, 
they lie spread out ahead, gray and identical. T h e 
battle against dust and dirt is never w o n . 
Washing , i r o n i n g , sweeping, ferreting out rolls of 
l in t f rom under wardrobes—all this ha l t ing of decay 
is also the denial of life; for time simultaneously 
creates and destroys, and only its negative aspects 
concerns the housekeeper. 6 
In both of these examples, de Beauvoir exhibits her 
undervaluing of and even disdain for immanence. T h e 
confus ing t h i n g about her discussion of immanence is 
that it contains both truth and distortion. W h i l e it may be 
true that many women i n traditional relationships are, 
indeed, stuck i n the house a l l day and concern themselves 
entirely w i t h household matters whi le men go out into the 
p u b l i c w o r l d and do not seem to value their homes as 
h ighly as women do, what should we conclude from this? 
S h o u l d we conclude that men are right to feel as they do, as 
she seems to i m p l y , or should we perhaps wonder why she 
considers matters of the home, so fraught w i t h emotional 
significance for both men and women, so relatively insig-
nificant? By the same token, there is both truth and distor-
t ion i n her descriptions of chi ldbearing and housework. 
M a n y women hate being pregnant and despise house-
work, partial ly because, no doubt, they correctly feel they 
have been maneuvered into d o i n g them without being 
able to make real choices. What should we conclude from 
the fact that men feel trapped i n their homes and many 
women loathe things connected w i t h domesticity and 
childrearing? It seems obvious that we should conclude, at 
least, that no one w h o hates housework ought to do it, no 
one should spend her life deal ing exclusively w i t h the 
negative side of immanence, pregnancy is diff icult and 
uncomfortable and one needs to want a c h i l d very m u c h to 
be w i l l i n g to put u p w i t h its discomforts and inconven-
iences. However, one suspects that these conclusions 
w o u l d not be de Beauvoir's. She seems to have a funda-
mental aversion to the physical except as an instrument. 
T o use one's body for one's o w n purposes is a pleasure. 
T h i s involves the use of transcendence but to use one's 
body and one's time (which is, after a l l , connected to 
immanence—our mortality lies i n our immanence) to do 
things w h i c h are not redeemed by transcendence, w h i c h 
have no transcendent purpose, w h i c h are not creative—is 
not a pleasure, and furthermore, seems to be moral ly 
suspect. 
H o w d id de Beauvoir come to believe it possible that one 
c o u l d s imply accent one's immanence, have it dealt w i t h 
by others, avoid involvement w i t h the bodily except for 
sex, regard such significant h u m a n events as chi ldbearing 
and chi ldrearing as relatively unimportant i n the larger 
scheme of things and st i l l avoid bad faith? T h e answer to 
this question lies i n The Ethics of Ambiguity. 
De Beauvoir believes that people both want and ought 
to be free. Freedom is not our only desire; i n my o p e n i n g 
discussion, I mentioned her view that we also w i s h to 
avo id freedom. O u r desire to do so takes the form of 
w a n t i n g s imply to be, i n the way a physical object exists. 
However, for de Beauvoir, this is not a legitimate desire 
because it involves denying our freedom, and freedom is 
the def ining characteristic of h u m a n beings. She does not 
want us to completely deny the physical and the repeti-
tious, but she certainly does not see it as valuable in itself. 
Consider the f o l l o w i n g passages. 
T o w i s h for the disclosure of the wor ld and to assert 
oneself as freedom are one and the same movement. 
Freedom is the source from w h i c h a l l significations 
and a l l values spring. It is the or ig ina l condit ion of 
a l l just i f icat ion of existence. T h e man who seeks to 
justify his life must want freedom itself absolutely 
and above everything else.... It is necessarily sum-
moned u p by the values w h i c h it sets u p and 
through w h i c h it sets itself up. It cannot establish a 
denial of itself, for i n denying itself, it w o u l d deny 
the possibi l i ty of any foundat ion. T o w i l l oneself 
m o r a l and to w i l l oneself free are one and the same 
decision. 7 
However, it must not be forgotten that there is a 
concrete bond between freedom and existence; to 
w i l l m a n free is to w i l l there to be being, it is to w i l l 
the disclosure of being i n the joy of existence: i n 
order for the idea of l iberat ion to have a concrete 
meaning, the joy of existence must be asserted i n 
each one, at every instance: the movement toward 
freedom assumes its real, flesh and blood figure i n 
the w o r l d by th ickening into pleasure, into h a p p i -
ness.8 
T h u s , exercising one's transcendence is considerably 
more important than exercisingone's immanence. It is the 
def ining characteristic of h u m a n beings; it ought to be the 
value our choices are based o n and maximize, and its 
exercise causes happiness. Immanence seems to be only a 
vehicle for transcendence. O f course, we must exist i n 
order to exercise our transcendence (disclose being), but 
even our pleasure i n exist ing has to do w i t h "the move-
ment toward freedom". De Beauvoir is very severe w i t h 
those w h o are not occupied w i t h transcendence. 
If we were to try to establish a k i n d of hierarchy 
a m o n g men, we w o u l d put those who are denuded 
of this l i v i n g warmth—the tepidity w h i c h the Gos-
pel speaks o f — o n the lowest r u n g of the ladder. T o 
exist is to make oneself as lack of being; it is to cast 
oneself into the wor ld . Those w h o occupy them-
selves i n restraining this or ig ina l movement can be 
considered as sub-men. They have eyes and ears, but 
from their ch i ldhood on they make themselves b l i n d 
and deaf, without love and without desire. T h i s 
apathy manifests a fundamental fear i n the face of 
existence, i n the face of the risks and tensions w h i c h 
it implies . T h e sub-men rejects this " p a s s i o n " 
w h i c h is his h u m a n condit ion, the laceration and 
failure of that drive toward being w h i c h always 
misses its goal , but w h i c h thereby is the very exist-
ence w h i c h he rejects.9 
For de Beauvoir, our humanity is i n some sense defined 
by a spontaneous impulse towards creating the projects 
that ult imately create ourselves; she believes that h u m a n 
beings naturally want to exercise their freedom and br ing 
new projects into being. She sees the opposite of this 
impulse as apathy, a k i n d of failure of life energy. T h e 
exercise of our transcendence just is that life energy; the 
failure to exercise it, our attempt to masquerade as 
immanence only, is a denial of our humanity . A n interest 
i n immanence, unless it is redeemed by transcendence, is 
an avoidance of the most important aspect of life. I suspect 
de Beauvoir w o u l d consider an interest i n immanence and 
the not ion that immanence is something i n w h i c h one 
could even have an interest unless one were either avoid-
i n g one's transcendence or forced to, as women are, as 
essentially mysterious. What c o u l d there be to be inter-
ested in? By connecting our exercise of transcendence to 
our destiny as h u m a n beings, anyone w h o is not funda-
mentally interested i n and committed to transcendence as 
a value is not quite h u m a n or, at the very least, i n serious 
bad faith. Indeed, i n The Second Sex, de Beauvoir argues 
that the v a l u i n g of transcendence through the rise of 
patriarchy was an important advance i n history (and a 
necessary one, from the standpoint of the development of 
the creative h u m a n being). 
T h e peoples w h o have remained under the thumb of 
the goddess mother, those w h o have retained the 
matri l ineal regime, are also those w h o are arrested at 
a pr imit ive stage of c ivi l izat ion. W o m a n was vener-
ated only to the degree that man made himself the 
slave of his o w n fears, a party to his o w n powerless-
ness: it was in terror and not i n love that he wor-
shipped her. H e could achieve his destiny only as he 
began by dethroning her. F r o m then on , it was to be 
the male pr inc iple of creative force, of l ight , of intel-
l igence, of order, that he w o u l d recognize as 
sovereign. 1 0 
For de Beauvoir the v a l u i n g of transcendence over 
immanence is connected w i t h power: the power to create, 
the power to achieve. She sees a regard for immanence as 
i n v o l v i n g the belief either that one is powerless, as i n the 
case of women, or that power lies outside h u m a n agency, 
as i n the case of the belief of the power of the goddess. 
Either way, a failure to value transcendence more h ighly 
than immanence deprives h u m a n beings (or, i n de Beau-
voir's account, males) of the power that should be theirs. 
Interestingly, she does not discuss the extent to w h i c h 
v a l u i n g transcendence wi thout respecting and v a l u i n g 
immanence has its o w n dark side. In my discussion of 
immanence below, I w i l l talk about positive reasons for 
tak ing immanence seriously; now I only want to mention 
an important negative aspect of overvaluing transcendence. 
T h e currently fashionable belief, i n both men and 
women, that somehow one can do anything, that causal 
factors—sex, class, age, health—are irrelevant, that the 
body has no l imits and is a perfectly logical i m p l i c a t i o n of 
seeing oneself i n terms of one's transcendence. If our 
h u m a n i t y resides i n our abi l i ty and wil l ingness to exercise 
our transcendence, then the more we exercise our trans-
cendence, the more h u m a n we are. T h i s leads to a very 
dangerous k i n d of hubris , a lack of respect and love for the 
bodily , a sense that a n y t h i n g can be controlled. T h e con-
sequences of such a belief i n personal relations, interna-
t ional relations and i n our attitudes towards and actions 
towards nature, are everywhere to be seen. If we are to 
avoid the unpleasant present and future that this belief 
may wel l help br ing about, we need to take immanence 
more seriously. But how? What is there, after a l l , to take 
seriously? 
W h i l e there is a special joy i n creation, i n choosing 
goals, i n b r i n g i n g into existence things w h i c h never 
existed before and have come f rom one's o w n imagina-
t ion, not to ment ion the pleasure of exercising a measure 
of power and control over one's o w n level of physical and 
psychological comfort, that these are the only worthwhi le 
joys of life seems unl ike ly . De Beauvoir does not seem to 
consider the possibil i ty that exercising one's immanence 
might be just as interesting, pleasurable and rewarding as 
exercising one's transcendence. Even a modest amount of 
reflection produces such examples as taking pleasure i n 
one's existence as a physical being through physical activ-
ity and/or time spent i n contemplat ion and connection 
w i t h the rest of the physical world , i.e., that contemplation 
of nature, pleasurable exercise, the deep pleasures of sexu-
ali ty and affection. W i t h respect to the repetitious aspects 
of immanence, especially immanence embodied i n domes-
ticity, consider the pleasures involved i n certain ritualized 
and traditional pastimes—the sense of connection w i t h 
the past involved i n family or cultural traditions, the daily 
routines of family life; there is something uniquely mov-
i n g i n real izing that one is d o i n g something—preparing a 
tradit ional meal, engaging i n certain holiday r i tua ls— 
that many generations of women/men/children have 
done before, or that one's o w n family has done before 
(only, of course, if one does not feel coerced into d o i n g 
them). However, de Beauvoir might be w i l l i n g to agree to 
these sorts of examples as exceptional i n some ways. Does 
this mean that the diff iculty here is superficial rather than 
structural? C o u l d her view be revised in fairly m i n o r ways 
to accommodate va lu ing immanence without serious dis-
tortion? T h e answer is no. 
T o decide to embrace one's immanence thoroughly 
requires at least two things that, i n de Beauvoir's view, 
w o u l d be extremely difficult to accept. First, one w o u l d 
have to believe that the exercise of the w i l l , whi le impor-
tant, is not primary and define not exercising the w i l l in 
some way that does not involve seeing it as some sort of 
failure. For example, the opposite of w i l l e d activity is 
often thought to be passivity, or i n de Beauvoir's case, 
apathy. Both of these suggest that one is d o i n g absolutely 
n o t h i n g and has somehow fallen into a l i m p , will-less 
state. De Beauvoir imagines a failure to w i l l oneself free as 
an attempt to avoid one's ambiguity by just being one's 
immanence and refusing to take u p one's transcendence. 
Yet, there are other states—receptivity, deep experiences of 
being that involve the experiencing of a great deal of 
energy and pleasure, indeed, the experience of pleasure 
i tse l f—which do not involve the exercise of the w i l l , yet are 
not correctly described either as passivity or refusal to 
exercise the w i l l . T h e fundamental difference between the 
aforementioned states and the exercise of the w i l l is not 
that, i n the case of the former, one is do ing noth ing whi le 
i n the case of the latter one is d o i n g something. T h e 
difference is that, i n the case of the former, one is not 
attempting to accomplish anything, there is no goal i n 
sight beyond the experiences and pleasures of the moment, 
whi le i n the case of the latter there is nearly always some 
goal i n sight, else why exercise the w i l l at a l l . 
T h e other view that w o u l d have to be accepted involves 
an evaluation; the bodily and the physical i n general have 
value, not just as tools, but as forms of being. I do not 
k n o w whether de Beauvoir holds that view, but my doubts 
are strong. One need only consult the passages, quoted 
above, o n pregnancy to sense her distaste for the purely 
physical that is not redeemed by consciousness and/or 
purpose and choice . " G i v e n that she sees identif ication 
w i t h the bodily and the biological as the trap i n w h i c h 
w o m e n have been caught, one cannot blame her for her 
apparently strong negative feelings about the feminine 
p h y s i c a l . 1 2 Nevertheless, it is important to dist inguish 
carefully between fearing that one w i l l be forced to live 
one's life as a being without freedom and the use of her 
o w n consciousness and believing that our experience of 
the bodily and the involuntary is not, i n itself, worth-
whi le . T o take the latter view is dangerous andean lead to 
the endorsement of the culture-nature opposi t ion that by 
now is so famil iar to feminist thinkers and writers. 1 3 We 
require more respect for and cherishing of the bodily and 
those processes not accessible to our wi l l s , not less. 
I want n o w to move to a deeper level of consideration of 
the value of immanence, and to do so, I want to direct 
attention to the extent to w h i c h immanence and the love 
for immanence w o u l d be antithetical to v a l u i n g trans-
cendence more h ighly than any other way of being. It is, of 
course, true by def ini t ion that, when one value is para-
mount , others are excluded. Here we can see that there are 
ways of v a l u i n g immanence that are deeply at odds w i t h 
even j ust a very strong prej udice in favour of transcendence. 
Suppose we cultivated an attitude of love for and inter-
est i n immanence. Someone w o u l d st i l l have to do house-
work and housework w o u l d st i l l not be as interesting as 
reading phi losophy to those who are interested i n philos-
ophy. C h i l d b i r t h w o u l d s t i l l be pa in fu l and diff icult . 
However, these w o u l d be considered the negative side of 
something w h i c h also has a positive side; as an example of 
the positive, let me offer an example many of us may f ind 
famil iar . I have a garden. T h a t garden demands from me a 
great deal of effort of the same d u l l sort as sweeping and 
dusting. In order to keep insects and weeds at bay, I must 
watch, pick, spray and cultivate. T o a l low the flowers to 
develop fu l ly , I must fertilize and water. I do not particu-
larly enjoy d o i n g many of these things, or at least I do not 
enjoy them a l l the time. Nevertheless, the pleasure I get 
f rom contemplat ing the result, and the pleasure I get 
sometimes from engaging i n the process, the sense of 
having contributed to the development of something and 
at the same time the feeling of respect and appreciation for 
the entity's independently developing nature, greatly 
outweighs the aggravation. Sometimes on the way out of 
the house, I s imply stand and take pleasure i n the flowers. 
Part of my pleasure has to do w i t h my achievement (de 
Beauvoir w o u l d say, the exercise of my transcendence) and 
part has to do w i t h something that is most emphatically 
not connected w i t h the exercise of my transcendence, my 
respect for and appreciation of the independence and 
beauty of the natural wor ld . I cannot control it, but I can 
nurture it and love it. T h i s love itself i n a l l its many forms 
seems to me to be a seriously neglected h u m a n capacity. It 
is, I suspect, what Sarah R u d d i c k has i n m i n d in her essay, 
" M a t e r n a l T h i n k i n g " 1 4 . She borrows her not ion of atten-
tive love f rom Simone W e i l and Iris M u r d o c h ; she offers 
short passages f rom their works, and I w i l l quote at greater 
length: 
Beauty is the supreme mystery of this wor ld . It is a 
gleam w h i c h attracts the attention and yet does 
n o t h i n g to sustain it. Beauty always promises, but 
never gives anything; it stimulates hunger but has 
no nourishment for the part of the soul w h i c h looks 
i n the w o r l d for sustenance. It feeds only the part of 
the soul that gazes. W h i l e exci t ing desire, it makes 
clear that there is n o t h i n g i n it to be desired, because 
the one t h i n g we want is the exquisite anguish it 
infl icts, then desire is gradually transformed into 
love; and one begins to acquire the faculty of pure 
disinterested attention. 1 5 
A n d from Iris M u r d o c h : 
It is important too that great art teaches us how real 
things can be looked at and loved without being 
seized and used, wi thout being appropriated into 
the greedy organism of the self. T h i s exercise of 
detachment is di f f icul t and valuable whether the 
t h i n g contemplated is a h u m a n being or the root of a 
tree or the v ibrat ion of a co lour or a sound. Unsen-
timental contemplation of nature exhibits the same 
qual i ty of detachment: selfish concerns vanish, 
n o t h i n g exists except the things w h i c h are seen. 
Beauty is that w h i c h attracts this part icular sort of 
unselfish attention. It is obvious here what is the 
role, for the artist or spectator, of exactness and good 
v is ion : unsentimental , detached, unselfish, objec-
tive attention. 1 6 
Both W e i l and M u r d o c h regard aesthetic experiences of 
a certain k i n d and love, or at least this particular k i n d of 
love, as one th ing: the attention to and love for the natural 
w o r l d gives us the opportuni ty to step outside goal-
p u r s u i n g behavior, and especially the constant regarding 
of everything i n terms of the satisfaction of our o w n 
desires, and to inhabi t another realm of being. T h i s is, of 
course, profoundly antithetical to the v a l u i n g of trans-
cendence, at least i n de Beauvoir 's sense. V a l u i n g one's 
transcendence involves us ing one's freedom to choose pro-
jects, presumably projects that one wants to achieve, and 
w o r k i n g towards them; it involves v a l u i n g achievement, 
and not v a l u i n g those activities that do not result i n 
achievement. Attentive love for the natural w o r l d and our 
fel low h u m a n beings makes our seeing the w o r l d as 
instrument a n d others as partners i n achievement or use-
fu l i n some way m u c h more diff icult . 
In addit ion to the R u d d i c k / M u r d o c h , W e i l way of valu-
i n g immanence, another writer offers us a way of seeing 
the w o r l d and others that is not connected w i t h the valu-
i n g of transcendence. In Pornography and Silence, Susan 
G r i f f i n argues that pornography has to do w i t h the 
nature/culture split, the rejection and hatred of the body 
as symbolized by women, the rejection of eros itself. For 
G r i f f i n , eros has to do w i t h our sense of wholeness, both 
w i t h nature and w i t h i n ourselves. It is the connection of 
sexuality, sensuality, m i n d , expression and experience of 
feeling, and the sense that one need not reject and/or 
n u m b certain aspects of one's being—a k i n d of innocent 
responsiveness to the w o r l d and to others. In connection 
w i t h c h i l d pornography: 
In these acts, we attempt to destroy eros. For isn't it 
eros we rediscover i n the chi ld 's world? T h e beauty 
of the chi ld 's body. T h e chi ld 's closeness to the 
natural wor ld . T h e child's heart. H e r love. T o u c h 
never divided from meaning. Her trust. Her ignor-
ance of culture. T h e knowledge she has of her o w n 
body. T h a t she eats when she is hungry. Sleeps when 
she is tired. Believes what she sees. T h a t n o part of 
her body has been forbidden to her. N o part of this 
body is shamed, numbed, or denied. T h a t anger, 
fear, love, and desire pass freely through this body, 
and for her, meaning is never separate f rom feeling. 
But a l l this is erotic and erotic feeling brings one 
back to this state of innocence before culture teaches 
us to forget the knowledge of the body. T o make love 
is to become l ike this infant again. We grope w i t h 
our mouths toward the body of another being, 
w h o m we trust, w h o takes us i n her arms. We rock 
together w i t h this loved one. We move beyond 
speech. O u r bodies move past a l l the controls we 
have learned. We cry out i n ecstasy, i n feeling. We 
are back i n a natural w o r l d before culture tried to 
erase our experience of nature. In this wor ld , to 
touch another is to express love; there is no idea 
apart from feeling, and no feeling w h i c h does not 
r i n g through our bodies and our souls at once. 
T h i s is eros. O u r o w n wholeness. N o t the sensation 
of pleasure alone, nor the idea of love alone, but the 
whole experience of h u m a n love. T h e whole range 
of h u m a n capacity exists i n this love. Here is the 
capacity for speech and meaning, for culture, for 
memory, for imaginat ion , the capacity for touch 
and expression, and sensation and joy . 1 7 
T o value eros in this sense, to want to reconnect thought 
to feeling, sexuality to love, the m i n d to the body, to try to 
create a culture that allows eros to be expressed and not 
dismantled and divided, is also to value another way of 
be ing i n addit ion to the setting of goals and the creation of 
projects. For here, as i n attentive love, being is valued for 
its o w n sake, not to some other end. T h e i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of 
being and the experience of beauty and pleasure i n this 
form is its o w n point . 
It seems clear that de Beauvoir fears immanence. She 
fears it because the negative side has been a trap for women 
and because a preoccupation w i t h trying to control the 
immanent—keeping things from getting dirty, c leaning 
u p when they do, etc.,—is frustrating and time-wasting as 
a l i fe activity. N o one could deny that any of these things 
are appropriately feared and hated as miserable and soul-
destroying by someone who sees women a l l around her 
coerced into d o i n g them. T h i s is not the only aspect of 
immanence, nor does it offer a complete description of the 
experience of women. As she herself observes, we are both 
immanence and transcendence; my guess w o u l d be that 
many w o m e n experience aspects of family life as creative 
and interesting so l o n g as they are not coerced. Further, 
women may have access to opportunities to exercise the 
positive forms of v a l u i n g immanence: attentive love, as 
R u d d i c k c l a i m s 1 8 and less cut-off-ness than men from the 
bodily and eros. T o do justice to our beings, to be i n 
contact w i t h reality, we must look carefully at a l l aspects 
of immanence and transcendence and how we value each. 
A f inal word on the necessity of respect for immanence. 
T h r o u g h o u t both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The 
Second Sex, de Beauvoir clearly identifies creativity w i t h 
transcendence. Anyone who has ever written a phi losophy 
paper, painted a picture, or formulated any sort of theory, 
can attest to the fact that, though ideally creativity has to 
do w i t h the w i l l , the activity of the understanding and 
conscious i m a g i n i n g , i n the sense that one has access to 
the areas of consciousness needed, very often one does not. 
Creativity often requires us to wait w i t h patience at our 
desks and i n our studios, to wait without the self-torture 
involved i n constant inner u r g i n g and nagging. Ideas, 
especially o r i g i n a l ideas, are not always voluntary, nor is 
our abi l i ty to understand the h u m a n condit ion entirely 
under conscious control . We must learn to respect our 
o w n inner processes a long w i t h other natural processes to 
maximize creativity. In the end, both creativity and under-
standing itself depends on a combinat ion of active seek-
i n g , respectful wai t ing , and reflection on the results of 
both: d o i n g phi losophy, m a k i n g art, lov ing one's friends, 
a l l depend as m u c h on our capacities for receptivity to 
deep experience and attentive love as they do on our capac-
ities for active thought and conscious construction. 
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Night and Fear in the Living Room 
N i g h t and fear clasp hands 
and present themselves to my attention, 
pause on the kitchen steps 
to kick a piece of gravel 
wisp i ly aside. 
C o n t i n u i n g 
they shuffle faintly 
through discarded newspapers 
t ing 
o n the water pipes 
tap a brutal , gr imy t h u m b n a i l 
delicately on the sink's bare surface. 
Outside my doorway they rest 
breathing i n 
and out, shi f t ing 
from foot to foot so gently 
the floor hardly creaks. 
W h e n I close my eyes they lean i n 
the doorway and I feel their cool breath 
teasing the stray hair o n my neck. 
Hands st i l l jo ined they soft foot it 
into the l i v i n g room, to sit 
s lowly o n the o l d chairs, trail fingers 
across the mantel , swing the hanging plant. 
Just before it chimes they tap the clock 
to see if it's w o r k i n g , then they look out the windows 
and tease the neighbour's dog w h o whines 
and snuffles i n reply. 
E n o u g h , this O N C E I leap 
bravely f rom bed, f lashlight and reflex 
at the ready, dash about the house 
f l i c k i n g on lights, radio, television, 
drive them from the house 
to crouch snickering a m o n g the bushes 
below my w i n d o w . 
R h o n a M c A d a m 
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